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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, trial attorneys face an array of challenges resulting 
from the proliferation of electronic evidence.1  The volume of 
electronic evidence continues to mushroom as individuals increase 
e-mail usage as a means of communication in lieu of the 
telephone.2  Further, studies have shown a rapid increase in the 
 
†  J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; M.B.A., University 
of Wisconsin, Madison, 1989; B.S., Finance, Real Estate & Insurance, Minnesota 
State University, Mankato, cum laude, 1986. 
 1. David H. Schultz & J. Robert Keena, Discovery Challenges in the Electronic 
Age, 24 PA. LAW. 24, 24 (Sept.-Oct. 2002); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2218, at 
450 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that computers and electronic media store a large 
amount of information that is subject to litigation). 
 2. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal 
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 328 (2000); see Grace 
V. Bacon, The Fundamentals of Electronic Discovery, 47 B. B. J. 18, 18 (Mar./Apr. 
2003) (citing Wired Media (Dec. 27, 2002), at http://www.wiredmedia.co.uk/ 
news_full.asp?IDW297 (stating that approximately 31 billion e-mail messages were 
sent each day in 2002)); see also Ronald Raether, E-Mail Maelstrom, 13-Oct. BUS. L. 
TODAY 57, 57 (Sept./Oct. 2003) (estimating generation of more than 17.5 trillion 
electronic documents annually by 2005); META GROUP RESEARCH TREND, CONTENT 
AND COLLABORATION RESEARCH TRENDS FOR 2003/2004, at http://www. 
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revenue generated by consumer Internet purchases.3  Currently, 
electronic evidence comprises between thirty and seventy percent 
of all evidence in litigation matters.4  As organizations and 
individuals continue to implement advanced technologies, 
litigation discovery complications will only increase.5  
Technological advances not only simplify our daily lives, but also 
create data trails subject to electronic discovery.6 
Compared with paper documents, electronic documents are 
much more difficult to destroy.7  Once a document moves from a 
creator’s computer to a network server, a backup system makes a 
copy and can store the document indefinitely.8  A common 
misunderstanding is that once a user deletes an e-mail or a 
document from his or her personal computer, the e-mail or 
document cannot be recovered.9  However, advances in technology 
increase the likelihood that a shredded paper document or deleted 
e-mail is available on a backup system somewhere.10 
In framing a case, trial attorneys often seek to find the 
“smoking gun” in electronic form.11  E-mail increasingly provides 
 
metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=42394 (stating that 
“[t]hrough 2007, rising electronic communication volumes will frustrate users 
coping with information overload.”) (copy on file with author). 
 3. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 328 (stating that in 1996 
consumer purchases over the Internet totaled approximately $289 million and 
rose to $26 billion in 2001); see also Linda Rosencrance, Report: Online holiday 
shopping up 35% from 2002, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 6, 2004), available at  http: 
//www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/ebusiness/story/0,10801,88789,0
0.html?SKC=ebusiness-88789 (last visited March 20, 2004) (stating that during the 
2003 holiday season alone, consumers spent $18.5 billion, increasing 35% over the 
$13.7 billion spent during the 2002 holiday season). 
 4. Compare J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte, 59 
BENCH & B. MINN. 25, 25 (Mar. 2002) (stating that as much as thirty percent of all 
evidence is maintained in electronic form) with Schultz & Kenna, supra note 1, at 
27 (stating that seventy percent of all data is presently stored in electronic form). 
 5. Schultz & Kenna, supra note 1, at 27. 
 6. Id. 
 7. David Cearley et al., Enron Investigation Shows Importance of Proper Document 
Archive and Destruction Practices, META Group News Analysis (Feb. 11, 2002), at http: 
//www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=29234 (last 
visited March 20, 2004) (discussing how investigators in the Enron case searched 
server backup tapes for electronic records to recover copies of documents 
reportedly shredded by Arthur Andersen) (copy on file with author). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. Weiner, Digital Dangers: A Primer on Electronic 
Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 1, 3 (Jan. 2003). 
 10. Cearley et al., supra note 7, at 1. 
 11. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 329. 
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the crucial piece of information that determines the outcome of a 
case.12  Given the importance of discovery in litigation, coupled 
with the increased use of computers to generate information, 
courts will most likely see a rise in the number of discovery disputes 
resulting from electronic discovery.13 
This comment begins by exploring the federal rules relevant to 
discovery of electronic evidence.14 Section three introduces issues 
resulting from advances in technology and the 1970 amendment to 
Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).15  
Section three also studies examples of how district courts in the 
Eighth Circuit have resolved electronic discovery disputes involving 
the manner and means of accessing information, discovery cost 
issues, and accusations of lost or destroyed information.16 Courts, 
including the Eighth Circuit, apply discretion when determining 
how to resolve electronic discovery disputes.17  The comment 
suggests that until courts adopt guidelines for managing electronic 
discovery disputes or the rule drafters amend the federal rules to 
encompass electronic discovery issues, attorneys will be left 
guessing how courts might resolve the disputes.18  Until that day, 
attorneys should remain cognizant that case-specific details will 
guide the court’s use of discretion.19 
II. FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
One purpose of the federal rules governing discovery is to 
promote efficiency.20  Although discovery rules are intended to 
facilitate an orderly and cost-effective discovery process between 
the parties, courts are still called upon to provide guidance and 
control.21  Courts step in to help resolve disputes involving 
electronic discovery issues because the pertinent discovery rules do 
not adequately address problems created by the discovery of 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 341. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the rules “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action”). 
 21. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.42 (1995). 
3
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electronic information.22 
In 1970, FRCP 34(a) was amended to address issues brought 
about by the advent of the computer age.23  Originally, Rule 34(a) 
simply permitted a party to request production of documents or 
tangible things.24  The 1970 amendment to Rule 34(a) defined 
documents as including other “data compilations from which 
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the 
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable 
form.”25  This inclusive definition of documents reflected changing 
technology.26 
Rule 34(a) permits discovery of documentary information 
stored on computers whether on hard disk, back-up tapes, or other 
peripheral devices.27  Further, the Advisory Committee Notes state 
that the 1970 Amendment to Rule 34(a) applies to “electronic data 
compilations from which information can be obtained only with 
the use of detection devices . . . .”28 
Practitioners accept that Rule 34 allows discovery of 
information stored on a computer.29  However, Rule 34 does not 
address issues related to the manner and means for such 
information disclosure.30  As a result, the discovery burden in terms 
 
 22. See Jason Krause, E-Discovery Order Changing the Rules, Federal Decision Deals 
with Who Pays the Costs, 22 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1 (June 6, 2003) (noting that pre-trial 
discovery motions are usually invisible but a complicated question for courts is 
how to handle the mountains of electronic evidence that are available for 
discovery); see also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 346-51 (concluding that 
Rule 34 has shortcomings and noting that courts may not be able to address new 
issues resulting from electronic discovery under Rule 34). 
 23. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 450. 
 24. See id. § 2201, at 352.  The original Rule 34(a) provided the following: 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon 
notice to all other parties, the court . . . may order any party to 
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by 
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, 
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible 
things . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (1968) (amended 1970). 
 25. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 450. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 27. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
PROBLEMS § 4.16 (1983) [hereinafter DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS] 
(stating that documentary information, whether stored on punched data cards, 
electronic disks, or computer banks, is discoverable). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 29. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 451. 
 30. DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS, supra note 27, § 4.16; see FED. 
R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (“[I]f the discovering party needs to 
4
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of discovery scope and cost is placed on the party responding to a 
discovery request.31 
FRCP Rule 26 operates to relieve the discovery burden placed 
upon the responding party by prohibiting cumulative or duplicative 
discovery requests.32  Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of matters 
that are “relevant to the claim or defense” as long as “the discovery 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”33  Although the discovery scope under Rule 26 appears 
quite broad, it does provide an inherent proportionality test.34  Rule 
26 requires consideration of the burden of producing the 
information along with the potential benefit of the requested 
information to determine whether information must be 
produced.35  Therefore, even in complex litigation, discovery does 
not warrant uncovering every piece of evidence.36  
Rule 26 does not, however, directly provide guidance 
regarding how much information a party should produce, or which 
party should bear the expense of costly electronic discovery.37  
Because of the void in Rule 26, practitioners predict the number of 
electronic discovery disputes will surge.38  This comment draws 
attention to a deficiency in the federal rules in terms of a general 
inability to manage electronic discovery problems.39  Today, 
complicated questions commonly arise when discovery involves a 
request for computerized information.40  Case law continues to 
 
check the electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect 
to . . . confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters.”). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(i) (stating the court shall limit discovery if it 
determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, 
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive”). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(i). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (stating a court can limit discovery when 
“the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). 
 36. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.41 (1995). 
 37. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (providing a seven-factor guideline to help determine which party should 
bear the cost of electronic discovery); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, No. 98 Civ.8272(RPP) 2002 WL 
975713 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (providing an eight-factor guideline to help 
determine which party should bear the cost of electronic discovery). 
 38. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 341. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. 1A DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: 
CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED, § 34.12, at 191 (4th ed. 2002); see also Schultz & Keena, 
5
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guide how parties should address the issue of the manner and 
means for disclosure of computerized information.41 
III. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE DISPUTES: 
HOW DO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURTS DECIDE THE ISSUES? 
Use of electronic evidence presents challenges for litigators 
and courts not only in terms of the manner and means of accessing 
the information,42 but also in terms of which party should bear the 
cost of electronic discovery,43 where to look for the information,44 
and spoliation of evidence.45  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
leave the decisions regarding procedures for discovering electronic 
evidence to the courts.46  The outcomes of electronic discovery 
 
supra note 1, at 27 (stating that “technological developments . . . create trails of 
data complicating legal discovery”). 
 41. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 40, § 34.12, at 191.  Cf. Scheindlin & Rabkin, 
supra note 2, at 381-82 (noting that the time is right for the legal community to 
focus on nationwide use of technology and the need for amendments to the 
existing rules to provide decisional law addressing the special properties of 
information technology). 
 42. DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS, supra note 27, § 4.16. 
 43. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting 
the district court must exercise its discretion in deciding which party should incur 
the cost of complying with a discovery order); see also Brown & Weiner, supra note 
9, at 14 (noting that courts are adopting new approaches to determine which party 
should bear the expense of electronic discovery and that the McPeek court 
reviewed cases that involved cost shifting and characterized the cases as 
“idiosyncratic and provid[ing] little guidance”) (citing McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 
F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001)). 
 44. Bacon, supra note 2, at 19. 
 45. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 561, 619 (2001) (defining spoliation as “a litigant’s destruction of evidence 
that is either relevant to the litigation or reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence, in violation of a duty to preserve that evidence”) 
(citing Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *11 (Mass. 
App. Ct. June 16, 1999)); see also Ian C. Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs 
and Risks Associated with Electronic Discovery, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 8, 9 (July 
1998) (describing spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of 
evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence, in 
pending or future litigation”). 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (stating in many 
instances respondent will need to supply a printout of computer data, and the 
burden placed on respondent will vary from case to case); see also Oppenheimer 
Fund, 437 U.S. at 358 (noting the district court must exercise its discretion in 
deciding which party should incur the cost of complying with a discovery order); 
Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652-54 (D. Minn. 2002) 
(discussing procedures previously used by parties in other cases when resurrecting 
data, and outlining how the plaintiff should proceed in resurrecting electronic 
data); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 381-82 (noting the “specter of 
6
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disputes in the Eighth Circuit courts47 are unpredictable because 
courts apply discretion in resolving the disputes.48 
A.  Access to Electronic Evidence 
Computer systems vary from one organization to another.49  
Consequently, questions arise regarding the most efficient means 
of accessing computerized information.50  A leading case to address 
whether the responding party must make the computerized 
information available in a computer-readable format is National 
Union Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.51 
In the context of the manner and means of accessing 
electronic evidence, an Eighth Circuit court, in Antioch Co. v. 
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., referred to other circuits for guidance.52  In 
Antioch, the court addressed the issue of whether to grant a motion 
to expedite discovery of computer equipment to investigate the 
electronic content.53  The plaintiff moved to expedite discovery out 
of a concern that the defendants might destroy documents relevant 
 
immense confusion” inherent in electronic discovery and the need for 
amendments to discovery rules to effectively govern electronic discovery). 
47.  While the Eighth Circuit has yet to address the issue, as discussed in this 
article, various district courts within the Eighth Circuit have resolved electronic 
discovery disputes in a reactive manner, on a case-by-case basis. 
 48. See Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 
2002) (applying discretion in determining which party should bear the cost of 
electronic discovery); Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 652-53 (applying compromise from 
two previous district court decisions in the Seventh and Ninth circuits in 
determining how to direct parties to resurrect data); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 954-56 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying discretion in awarding sanctions). 
 49. Cf. Matt Cain, E-Mail Off and On the Record: Part 1, META Group 
Research—Delta Summary (Oct. 16, 2002), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgi-
bin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=33595 (last visited March 20, 2004) 
(discussing e-mail storage requirements and noting the multitude of e-mail 
archival systems) (copy on file with author). 
 50. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 452-53 (noting that initial 
disclosures discussed during the Rule 26(f) conference can facilitate the process of 
identifying the most efficient means of access to computerized information). 
 51 See id. § 2218, at 451-52 (citing Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (D.C. Pa. 1980) (referencing defendants’ request 
that plaintiff provide a computer tape of information previously provided in a 
computer printout because of the extensive time required for inputting the 
information into a computer for analysis purposes)). 
 52 See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 652-54 (applying compromise from two previous 
district court decisions in the Seventh and Ninth circuits regarding the process for 
resurrecting data from respondent’s computers). 
 53. Id. at 650.  
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to the litigation.54  In addition, the plaintiff requested that the court 
appoint a neutral computer forensics expert.55 
The plaintiff believed that the defendants’ continued use of a 
computer, where data remained on the computer’s hard drive, 
would overwrite the data and make the data irretrievable.56  
Further, because the data contained product development data 
and the parties were direct competitors, the plaintiff requested that 
a computer forensics expert retrieve the stored data to ensure 
recovery and preservation of the information.57  Although the 
defendants opposed the motions because the parties had not held 
a Rule 26(f) discovery conference, the court granted the plaintiff’s 
motions.58 
In reaching its conclusion, the Antioch court noted that even 
though the parties had not held a Rule 26(f) discovery conference, 
discovery should commence in order to ensure preservation of 
computer records.59  The court noted that by allowing discovery to 
commence earlier than usual, the parties would still have the same 
amount of time to respond to discovery as allowed by the federal 
rules.60  Finally, when granting the plaintiff’s motion for the court 
to appoint a computer forensics expert, the Antioch court 
referenced cases from courts within the Seventh and Ninth circuits 
when outlining the manner and means to recover the 
information.61 
Specifically, the Antioch court allowed the plaintiff to select an 
expert of its choice in the computer forensics field.62  Next, the 
court ordered the defendants to make all of their computer 
equipment available to the expert at the defendants’ place of 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; see also Dan Verton, Let the Pros Investigate Computer Crimes, 
COMPUTERWORLD, (July 15, 2002), available at http://www.computerworld.com/ 
printthis/2002/0,4814,72659,00.html (last visited March 20, 2004) (defining 
computer forensics as the “identification, extraction, preservation and 
documentation of computer evidence that will stand up to legal challenges about 
its authenticity, accuracy and integrity”). 
 56. Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 650-51. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 651-53. 
 59. Id. at 651. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 652-53 (referencing Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 
194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) and Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999)). 
 62. Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653. 
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business at a mutually agreeable time.63  Further, the expert was to 
use best efforts to avoid any unnecessary disruptions to the 
defendants’ business activities.64  The court directed the parties to 
determine an appropriate time for the expert to access the 
defendants’ computer equipment bearing in mind the interest in 
minimizing the burden and inconvenience caused to the 
defendants.65  Regarding confidentiality, the court specified: (1) 
the expert was to avoid inconveniencing the defendant, “up to and 
including the retention of computer equipment on defendants’ 
premises[,]” (2) the only people authorized to access the 
equipment were the expert and employees of the expert, and (3) 
the expert was to maintain all information in the strictest 
confidence.66 
The Antioch court’s order involved a complex sequence of 
events, beginning with the computer forensics expert issuing a 
report to the parties detailing the actions he took with regard to 
each piece of equipment the defendants produced.67  In addition, 
the computer expert was to produce two copies of the resulting 
data and transmit one copy of the data to the court and the other 
to the defendants.68  The defendants would then sift through the 
data produced by the expert to locate any relevant documents and 
provide them to the plaintiff along with a privilege log.69 
The court built into its order a method of resolving any 
disputes that might arise under this system.  In the event the 
plaintiff disputed an allegedly privileged claim, or claimed the 
existence of additional relevant documents, the court would 
conduct an in-camera review.70  Unless modified by another court, 
the procedure outlined by the court would govern the information 
recovery process.71 
Antioch illustrates how specific facts, rather than a general 
guideline, lead a court to resolve issues that arise in dealing with 
electronic information.  At its most basic level, Antioch 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  A privilege log would describe the nature of any privileged documents 
and allow the plaintiff to assess the applicability of the privilege claimed.  Id. at 
653-54. 
 65. Id. at 654. 
 66. Id. at 653. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 654. 
 71. Id. 
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demonstrates that accessing electronic information is not as simple 
as providing a paper document to the other party.  At the time of 
the decision, the absence of clear guidelines detailing how to 
manage access to electronic information led the court to outline an 
extensive process based on the case-specific facts.  Although further 
discovery disputes were not reported in Antioch, additional case 
analysis illustrates that problems continue to loom when parties 
request electronic information.72 
B.  Electronic Discovery Cost Disputes 
The increased cost of discovery, always an important 
consideration, is a second issue resulting from increased use of 
computerized information.73  Typical paper discovery requires the 
producing party to bear the financial expense of producing 
documents.74  A party may encounter an undue cost burden when 
attempting to produce computerized information in response to a 
request for such information.75  Courts, however, retain discretion 
to shift the expense to the other party when it is unduly 
burdensome.76As a result, attorneys are often left to guess how the 
 
 72. See infra Part III.B-C (analyzing the Eighth Circuit courts’ resolution of 
electronic discovery disputes in additional matters). 
 73. See JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL 
DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE, § 13.12 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2003) (discussing the 
cost of producing computerized information); see also Brown & Weiner, supra note 
9, at 14 (noting the significant costs associated with electronic discovery); Peter 
Brown, Discovery and Use of Electronic Evidence, 734 PRACTICING L. INST. 391, 398 
(2003) (noting that costs increase significantly when special equipment or 
programming expertise is needed to extract electronic data from outmoded 
technology formats). 
 74. See GRENIG & KINSLER, supra note 73, § 13.12 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 1, § 2218) (stating a responding party ordinarily bears the cost of producing 
information in cases where the responding party is required to provide a print-out 
or otherwise make the information reasonably usable); see also Krause, supra note 
22, at 1 (noting that in the world of paper discovery, it is widely assumed that the 
producing party bears the burden of producing documents). 
 75. See GRENIG & KINSLER, supra note 73, § 13.12. (citations omitted) (noting 
the cost of producing information may be an issue when requested e-mail or voice-
mail messages have been erased from a hard disk but the party is capable of 
retrieving the information using sophisticated means). 
 76. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting 
the district court can exercise its discretion in deciding which party should incur 
the cost of complying with a discovery order); Bacon, supra note 2, at 21 (noting 
that courts sometimes require the requesting party to pay the cost of electronic 
discovery and at other times require the parties split the cost of electronic 
discovery) (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 
Civ.8272, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8308, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002); Byers v. Illinois 
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court will manage discovery cost issues.77  In addition, courts also 
retain discretion to restrict the extent of discovery.78 
1.  Court’s Use of Discretion 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas addressed a discovery cost issue in Concord Boat Corp. v. 
Brunswick Corp.79 In Concord, Brunswick objected to the plaintiff’s 
motion to compel discovery of electronically stored information on 
the grounds that it would result in “unbearable expense.”80  The 
plaintiff’s motion requested the following: 
[A]ll electronic mail . . . files, including all current and 
backed-up versions of the files . . . . [A]ll versions, electronic 
and otherwise, of up to 1,000 documents . . . . [F]or 
Brunswick’s marine-related divisions and headquarters to 
identify, restore and produce all deleted and destroyed documents 
on their computer systems for the last five years . . . . 
[And] to . . . search . . . each computer at each Brunswick 
location.81 
In response, Brunswick argued that to comply with the 
plaintiff’s demands would result in not only “unbearable expense 
and interruption in conducting its business,” but also that it would 
be impossible to comply with the request.82 
The court’s solution was to order the parties to propose 
solutions regarding the request for e-mail files for discussion at a 
telephone conference.83  The court then stated that the plaintiff 
should specifically identify which of the 1000 requested documents 
should be produced and why they should be produced.84  Further, 
 
State Police, No. 99-C-8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9861, at *35-37 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 
2002); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437 (D. N.J. 2002)). 
 77. See Brown, supra note 73, at 398 (noting that “courts have not settled 
which party should ultimately bear the costs of electronic document production”).  
Some courts apply the traditional approach that companies using varied 
technologies assume the risks of discovery costs.  See id. at 399 (noting that one 
court recently attempted to formulate an eight-point set of guidelines to 
determine how to distribute electronic discovery costs) (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
 78. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 79. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1996 WL 
33347247, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 1996). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *3. 
 84. Id. 
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the court denied the plaintiff’s request for restoration of all deleted 
and destroyed documents on Brunswick’s computer systems on the 
grounds that the request appeared unduly burdensome.85  The 
court deferred its decision regarding what current electronic data 
of Brunswick should be extracted and produced.86  Instead, the 
court ordered Brunswick to provide a detailed description of all 
electronically stored information it maintained to the court and to 
the plaintiff.87 
The court’s decision to grant the motion in part, deny it in 
part, and defer it in part illustrates the merit of both parties’ 
positions.88  On the one hand, the court acknowledged the 
plaintiff’s concern that Brunswick’s initial document and 
information search was incomplete.89  On the other hand, the court 
acknowledged that Brunswick conducted a careful search.90  
However, the court noted, “[a]n all-encompassing search of all 
files, including e-mail, location of early versions of 1,000 files[,] and 
restoration of all documents deleted in the last five years would 
clearly be extremely burdensome.”91 
The discovery dispute in Concord did not end here.92  In a 
subsequent proceeding, the plaintiff again moved to compel 
production of e-mail.93  This time, the plaintiff requested that the 
court order Brunswick to produce all e-mail in its computer 
system.94  The request for discovery of all of Brunswick’s e-mail 
encompassed two separate e-mail systems.95  Brunswick’s issue in 
complying with the plaintiff’s production request was that e-mail 
recovery from the older e-mail system would require searching 
backup tapes.96  Further, to avoid disrupting Brunswick’s 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *4. 
 87. Id. at *4-5. 
 88. See id. at *2 (noting “[t]here is merit to both sides’ positions”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 
33352759, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (stating that over the last year, the 
parties had attempted to resolve numerous issues regarding electronic 
information). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (noting that when the present action commenced, defendant 
utilized an e-mail system named “Fisher” and subsequently that defendant began 
utilizing the Lotus Notes e-mail system). 
 96. Id. at *8-9. 
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continuing data-processing activities, Brunswick would need to 
duplicate its computing environment at the time of creation of the 
backup tape.97 
The court recognized the significant cost implications that 
would result from this request.98  The court also noted that the 
potential gains were questionable because of the limited number of 
backup tapes available.99  Consequently, the court did not require 
Brunswick to produce e-mail from the older e-mail system.100  The 
court did, however, order Brunswick to search its existing e-mail 
system for relevant e-mail.101 
Concord provides a good illustration of how courts wrestle with 
electronic discovery cost issues. Courts analyze specific facts to 
reach a conclusion, without relying on procedural rules, 
demonstrating to practitioners that courts use discretion in 
resolving electronic discovery disputes.  However, although the 
court weighed cost implications against potential information 
gains, the Concord case is not proactive because it fails to provide a 
clear set of guidelines regarding how courts will manage future 
electronic discovery disputes.  
2.  Broad Discovery Request Results in Denial of Motion to Compel 
Discovery 
In Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc.,102 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered a motion to compel discovery.103  The 
plaintiff in Toghiyany appealed a decision by the district court 
denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery of e-mail.104  The 
appellate court reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to 
compel discovery for gross abuse of discretion.105 
The plaintiff’s request for production included “any and all e-
mails concerning [p]laintiff . . . or his business.”106  The defendant 
argued that the plaintiff’s request was “overbroad and unduly 
 
 97. Id. at *9. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 309 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1093. 
 105. Id. (citing Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1040 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 106. Brief for Appellant at 45 n.1, Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 
F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1283). 
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burdensome.”107  The defendant presented evidence in support of 
this argument, illustrating that to comply with the plaintiff’s 
request it would take 1758 hours of a technical professional’s time 
and approximately $31,505 worth of computer equipment to 
restore and review the e-mail messages requested.108  The defendant 
even offered to make arrangements to comply with the plaintiff’s 
request if the plaintiff would agree to pay for the technical 
professional’s time and the equipment.109  The plaintiff did not 
respond to the defendant’s offer110 and the district court 
subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel.111 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred by 
not providing any reasons for the denial.112  The plaintiff asserted 
that to determine whether a discovery request is unduly 
burdensome, the court should weigh the benefit and burden of 
discovery.113  In response, the defendant argued that the court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel because 
the plaintiff did not provide sufficient support to overcome the 
defendant’s objection to the motion.114 
The defendant noted that the plaintiff’s request would have 
required it to scour “thousands of archived e-mails from backup 
tapes, of which only a tiny fraction involved the relevant employees’ 
e-mails.”115  In an effort to show the court the complexities involved 
in complying with the plaintiff’s request, the defendant provided 
the court with links to two web sites detailing the archived file 
recovery process.116  In response, the plaintiff asserted that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to not inquire into the 
feasibility of the defendant recovering a few select e-mails.117  The 
appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision denying the 
plaintiff’s motion to compel.118 
Toghiyany provides an example of how a court can manage 
 
 107. Brief for Appellee at 16, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283). 
 108. Id. at 54. 
 109. Id. at 54 n.11. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1. 
 112. Brief for Appellant at 47, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283). 
 113. Id. at 46 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053-
54 (S.D. Cal. 1999)). 
 114. Brief for Appellee at 53, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 54. 
 117. Reply Brief for Appellant at 20, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283). 
 118. Toghiyany, 309 F.3d at 1093. 
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electronic discovery cost issues by simply denying a motion to 
compel discovery.  The plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to the 
defendant’s offer to comply with the request on the condition that 
the plaintiff incur the cost of recovery may logically have 
influenced the appellate court’s decision.  Nevertheless, Toghiyany 
illustrates that when a party’s request is overly broad or irrelevant, a 
court may completely deny recovery of information, not simply 
limit recovery to what is reasonable and cost effective. 
3.   Zubulake: Second Circuit Court Guideline 
Recently, a decision from the Southern District of New York 
addressed the question of how to determine which party should pay 
for electronic discovery.119  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. involved 
allegations of employment discrimination, including gender 
discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation.120  To support 
her claim, the plaintiff-employee requested evidence stored on the 
defendants-employers’ backup tapes that was available only 
through a costly and time-consuming data retrieval process.121  The 
issue for the court was which party should bear the cost of restoring 
and producing the backup tapes.122 
Initially, to provide a framework for the court’s cost-shifting 
analysis, the judge ordered the defendants to restore and produce 
e-mail from five of the ninety-four backup tapes that the defendants 
identified as containing relevant documents.123  The defendants 
hired an outside vendor to perform the data restoration.124  The 
plaintiff selected the backup tapes that she wanted restored.125  The 
outside vendor was required not only to restore the identified 
tapes, but also to search through the restored e-mails for identified 
subject information such as the plaintiff’s name or initials.126  In 
return for the outside vendor’s services, the vendor billed the 
 
 119. Zubulake v. USB Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 120. Id. at 281. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 282. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  As an illustration of the amount of electronic information available 
with this type of request, the backup tapes corresponded to five months of e-mail 
sent to or from the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor.  Id. at 281-82.  The outside 
vendor restored the information and the restoration yielded a total of 8344 e-
mails.  Id. at 282. 
 126. Id. 
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defendants $11,524.63.127  The vendor’s bill included both the 
restoration services and the use of its computer systems.128  In 
addition to the outside vendor costs, the defendants incurred legal 
fees for document review production.129  Consequently, the total 
cost incurred in restoring five backup tapes was $19,003.43.130 
Faced with escalating discovery costs, the defendants asked the 
court to shift any further production costs to the plaintiff.131  Based 
on the initial cost of restoring the five tapes, the defendants 
estimated that the total cost of restoring the requested documents 
would equal approximately $273,600.132 
The court commenced the analysis of a possible cost shift by 
referencing general rules governing the discovery process.133  In 
particular, the court noted that FRCP 26(b)(2) provides a 
proportionality test governing the permissibility of discovery.134  
The court cited Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders135 for the 
proposition that “ ‘the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests,’ [and] requests that run afoul of 
the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test may subject the requesting 
party to protective orders under Rule 26(c), ‘including orders 
conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the 
costs of discovery.’ ”136 
Prior to identifying the factors used to determine the 
appropriateness of cost shifting, the court noted that cost shifting is 
potentially appropriate only when a party seeks inaccessible data.137  
The Zubulake court then identified a list of seven factors to 
determine which party should pay for discovery of inaccessible 
data:138   
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored 
to discover relevant information; 2. The availability of 
 
 127. Id. at 283. 
 128. Id. at 282. 
 129. Id. at 283. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. (calculating an additional $165,954.67 to restore and search the 
remaining backup tapes, and an additional $107,694.72 in attorney and paralegal 
document review costs). 
 133. Id. at 283 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)-(2)). 
 134. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)). 
 135. 437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
 136. Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283 (quoting Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358). 
 137. Id. at 284. 
 138. Id. 
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such information from other sources; 3. The total cost of 
production, compared to the amount in controversy; 4. 
The total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party; 5. The relative ability of each party 
to control costs and its incentive to do so; 6. The 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 7. 
The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.139 
Noting the concern of commentators regarding an eight-factor 
test articulated in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 
Inc.,140 the Zubulake court modified the list of factors.141  The court 
stated that the seven factors were “designed to simplify application 
of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test in the context of 
electronic data . . . .”142 
The court noted that in the future courts should weigh the 
factors in the order listed.143  In particular, the court stated the 
most weight should be given to factors one and two.144  
Nevertheless, the court reiterated, “a list of factors is not merely a 
matter of counting and adding; it is only a guide.”145 
In Zubulake, the court concluded that the parties should share 
the costs.146  The court ordered the defendants to bear seventy-five 
percent and the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the restoration 
costs.147  The court weighed the seven factors and found that some 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 975713 (S.D.N.Y. May 
9, 2002). 
 141. See Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 284 (quoting commentators that the Rowe 
factors “tend to favor the responding party, and frequently result in shifting the 
costs of electronic discovery to the requesting party”).  The Rowe court suggested 
consideration of the following eight factors before shifting costs to the requesting 
party: 
The specificity of the discovery requests . . . ; The likelihood of a 
successful search . . . ; The availability of such information from other 
sources . . . ; The purposes for which the responding party maintains 
the requested data . . . ; The relative benefit to the parties of obtaining 
the information . . . ; The total cost associated with production . . . ; 
The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do 
so . . . ; The resources available to each party . . . . 
Brown & Weiner, supra note 9, at 15-16 (referencing Rowe, 205 F.R.D. 421 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) aff’d, 2002 WL 975713 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002)). 
 142. Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 284. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 289. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 291. 
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of the factors disfavored cost shifting, but only “slightly so.”148  
Further, the court reasoned that the success of the document 
search was somewhat speculative; therefore, the plaintiff should 
bear some of the costs.149  The court concluded the “precise 
allocation [of costs] is a matter of judgment and fairness rather 
than a mathematical consequence of the seven factors discussed 
above.”150  By requiring the plaintiff to bear some of the costs, the 
court concluded that the partial cost shift ensured the defendants’ 
cost would not be unduly burdensome, while also ensuring that it 
would not chill the right of the plaintiff to pursue a claim.151 
Zubulake again provides an illustration of how courts apply 
discretion when resolving discovery disputes.  By identifying seven 
factors, the court provides a general guideline for attorneys to 
consider when faced with discovery cost issues.152  In addition, by 
applying more weight to specific factors, the court recognizes a 
party’s effort in specifying its discovery needs.  The court also 
recognizes the importance of confining a discovery request to 
relevant information that is unavailable from other sources.  The 
effect of the Zubulake court’s seven-factor test is twofold.  First, it 
provides relief to a party that receives an unduly burdensome 
discovery request by providing rationale for the court to either shift 
the cost to the requesting party, or to order the parties to share the 
cost.  Second, it rewards a party that carefully confines its discovery 
request to relevant and otherwise unavailable information by 
denying a responding party’s request to shift or share discovery 
costs. 
C.  Evidence Spoliation 
A final issue resulting from use of electronic evidence is 
spoliation,153 which the federal rules do not directly address.154  
Success of the discovery process is dependant upon and 
 
 148. Id. at 289. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 284. 
 153. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Redish, supra note 46, at 628 n.212 (noting that “[a]lthough Rule 
37(b)(2) authorizes sanctions for the failure to permit discovery, this authority 
under the rules often has been construed to be confined to situations in which the 
party destroyed evidence following issuance of a discovery order”). 
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intertwined with spoliation issues.155  Companies are taking 
proactive measures to help ensure that if they receive a broad 
discovery request, they will not need to search gigabytes of 
information.156  By effectively managing information, companies 
can better determine what is and what is not relevant information 
in response to a discovery request.157  Companies must nevertheless 
remain cognizant of the fact that although they follow document-
retention and document-management policies, they cannot destroy 
documents when the documents are subject to litigation.158 
Under the spoliation of evidence doctrine, if a company has 
not retained relevant documents, including computerized 
information, a court may award the requesting party with a specific 
jury instruction, or possibly entry of judgment.159  Courts vary in 
determining when spoliation actually occurs.160  When spoliation 
occurs is important because of the potential sanctions a court may 
order in response to spoliation of evidence.161  Courts view the 
selective destruction of documents with a wary eye.162  Parties can 
nevertheless find some solace in the fact that courts do not penalize 
parties when a party can demonstrate that document destruction 
was done in good faith.163 
 
 155. Id. at 619. 
 156. See Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era: 
Considerations for Corporate Counsel, 20 No. 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 16-17 
(Sept. 2003) (noting that companies are implementing document retention 
policies and document management procedures to help streamline the 
production process in the event of litigation). 
 157. Id. at 17. 
 158. Ballon, supra note 45, at 9-10. 
 159. See id. at 9 (stating that “spoliation of evidence may result in the entry of 
judgment, an adverse inference[,] or merely an award of attorney’s fees, 
depending on the severity and significance of the destruction to the case at bar 
and the destroying party’s intent”). 
 160. See Redish, supra note 46, at 628 n.214 (contrasting a decision where the 
court concluded spoliation cannot be found before the lawsuit commenced with a 
decision where the court found a duty to preserve evidence arises when the party 
possessing the evidence has notice of its relevance) (citing Giant Food Stores, Inc. 
v. K-Mart Corp., No. 94-6817, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17831, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
4, 1996); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991)). 
 161. Id. at 620. 
 162. Dort & Spatz, supra note 156, at 17 (citing Patrick Grady, Discovery of 
Computer Stored Documents & Computer Based Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up 
More than Necessary?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 542 (1996)). 
 163. Id. (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th 
Cir. 1988)). 
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1.  Good Faith Required When Implementing a Record Retention 
Policy 
In Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., the Eighth Circuit 
addressed spoliation of evidence under a record-retention policy.164  
At trial, the plaintiffs requested a jury instruction because 
Remington was unable to produce several documents that were 
destroyed under its record-retention policy.165  On appeal, 
Remington asserted that the district court erred by providing a jury 
instruction that allowed the jury to find a negative inference when 
a party could have produced a record but did not.166 
The court remanded the case to determine whether the jury 
instruction was proper and instructed the trial court to consider 
three factors before deciding to give the jury an instruction 
regarding the failure to produce evidence.167  The three factors 
were: (1) whether a record-retention policy is reasonable 
considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the relevant 
documents; (2) whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or 
related complaints have been filed, including the magnitude and 
frequency of such complaints; and (3) whether the document-
retention policy was instituted in bad faith.168 
The court concluded that it may be proper to give an 
instruction similar to the instruction requested by the plaintiffs 
when a company institutes a document-retention policy in bad 
faith.169  In addition, the court noted that even if a document-
retention policy did exist, a company might need to retain certain 
documents.170  The court bluntly stated that “a corporation cannot 
blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a 
seemingly innocuous document retention policy.”171 
In addition to its three-factor test, Lewy demonstrates that if a 
corporation implements a document-retention policy in bad faith, 
 
 164. Lewy, 836 F.2d 1104. 
 165. Id. at 1111. 
 166. See id. (instructing the jury that “[i]f a party fails to produce evidence 
which is under his control and reasonably available to him and not reasonably 
available to the adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable 
to the party who could have produced it and did not”). 
 167. Id. at 1112. 
 168. Id. (citing Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 169. See Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (stating that an adverse jury instruction may be 
proper when a company institutes a document retention policy for the purpose of 
limiting damaging evidence available to potential plaintiffs). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (citing Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 96). 
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and it later finds itself involved in litigation, a court can sanction 
the corporation by issuing a jury instruction permitting the jury to 
form inferences adverse to the corporation.  The underlying 
premise from Lewy is that once faced with pending litigation, a 
party must act in good faith to preserve and make available relevant 
information. 
2.  Sanctions for Non-Compliance with Pretrial Discovery Orders 
In Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, the District Court of Minnesota awarded 
sanctions when the defendant did not comply with pretrial 
discovery orders.172  The defendant left his job as an account 
manager with Lexis-Nexis and went to work for another online 
information services organization.173  When he left employment 
with Lexis-Nexis, the defendant proceeded to copy a customer-
contact database and hundreds of Lexis-Nexis e-mails from his 
Lexis-Nexis laptop and then transferred the information to his new 
employer-supplied laptop.174  The defendant also deleted what he 
thought was outdated information from his Lexis-Nexis laptop, and 
he threw away the disk that he used to transfer the database and e-
mail information.175 
When Lexis-Nexis learned that the defendant began working 
with the new online services company, Lexis-Nexis demanded that 
he return all Lexis-Nexis documents to the company.176  Lexis-Nexis 
brought suit after the defendant did not respond to its request.177  
Subsequently, Lexis-Nexis motioned for expedited discovery and 
filed its first set of requests for production of documents.178  The 
defendant confirmed that he would produce all non-privileged 
responsive documents.179 
Throughout the expedited discovery process the parties 
exchanged data that later turned out to be a reconstructed version 
of the customer-contact database rather than the complete 
database, which the court had ordered.180  In addition, the 
defendant confirmed that he deleted an earlier version of the 
 
 172. Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999). 
 173. Id. at 952. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 952-53. 
 177. Id. at 953. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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database from his computer.181  The defendant’s counsel then 
attempted to make an image copy of the laptop’s hard drive, and in 
doing so, defendant’s counsel inadvertently overwrote the 
remnants of some previously deleted information.182  Lexis-Nexis 
sought the help of a computer-forensics expert to analyze the 
deleted files from the defendant’s new laptop.183  The expert 
concluded that the defendant deleted a number of important 
Lexis-Nexis documents.184  Subsequently, Lexis-Nexis motioned for 
sanctions against the defendant.185 
The court noted that under Rule 37(b)(2), when a party 
violates a discovery order, the court “may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just.”186  Referencing Eighth Circuit 
precedent, the court “stated that ‘[s]anctions may be imposed 
against a litigant who is on notice that documents and information 
in his possession are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or 
are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence, and destroys such documents and information.’ ”187  The 
court summarized that “sanctions are appropriate when a party (1) 
destroys (2) discoverable material (3) which the party knew or 
should have known (4) was relevant to pending, imminent, or 
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”188 
The conflicting facts asserted by each party led the court to 
conclude that Lexis-Nexis satisfied the last three elements of its 
destruction-of-evidence claim.189  However, Lexis-Nexis did not 
convince the court on the most important element of the claim: 
that the defendant destroyed relevant evidence.190  After Lexis-
Nexis filed its motion for sanctions, the parties discovered that the 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 953-54 (noting that the basis for Lexis-Nexis’ motion for 
sanctions was that earlier the court issued a temporary restraining order against 
the defendant in order to ensure that he would deliver the copy of the database 
that he made to Lexis-Nexis and that he was not to retain a copy, and that 
defendant destroyed evidence). 
 186. Id. at 954. 
 187. Id. (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 
(C.D. Cal. 1984)). 
 188. Id. (quoting JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION of EVIDENCE § 3.8, at 
88 (1989)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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documents, which the parties believed were deleted, were 
inadvertently transferred to the defendant’s new laptop.191  Further, 
the court noted that although the defendant’s counsel 
inadvertently overwrote some data while making a copy of the 
defendant’s hard drive, Lexis-Nexis did not demonstrate that any of 
the lost data would have contained relevant information.192  The 
court then stated that even if it were to find that some of the 
relevant information had not been overwritten, Lexis-Nexis failed 
to demonstrate that the loss of evidence would prejudice its case.193 
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that there was little 
reason to believe that the lost information was substantially 
different from that of the preserved information.194  The court was 
not willing to presume that the overwritten computer data 
contained any more sensitive evidence than what Lexis-Nexis 
hoped to find at the outset.195  Consequently, the court determined 
that it would not draw any adverse inferences when evaluating 
Lexis-Nexis’ request for a preliminary injunction.196 
Aside from the preliminary injunction motion, the court 
concluded that the defendant’s conduct warranted monetary 
sanctions.197  Focusing on the defendant’s conduct198 and his delay 
in revealing information to Lexis-Nexis, the court concluded that 
the defendant’s actions “set off a high-tech wild goose chase that 
has needlessly multiplied the time and expense of this litigation.”199 
The court reserved judgment regarding the size of the monetary 
sanction because the litigation was still at an early stage.200  Wanting 
a more complete factual picture to emerge before assessing fees 
and costs, the court requested Lexis-Nexis to renew its motion at a 
more appropriate time.201 
 
 191. Id. at 954-55. 
 192. Id. at 955. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 955-56 (noting that Lexis-Nexis sought an injunction, asking the 
court to order termination of the defendant’s employment with his new 
employer). 
 197. Id. at 955. 
 198. See id. (noting the defendant created a new copy of the customer-contact 
database rather than simply turning over the database as it existed at the time of 
the hearing, and he copied the information after the court ordered him to not do 
so). 
 199. Id. at 956. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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The Lexis-Nexis case provides a good illustration of how what 
appears to be a simple discovery request can turn into a costly 
discovery dispute.  In its conclusion, the court even noted how the 
defendant’s conduct unnecessarily multiplied the time and 
expense involved in discovery.202  Lexis-Nexis clearly articulates what 
a court will require of a party when it files a motion for discovery 
sanctions on the premise of destruction of evidence.  Lexis-Nexis 
should further alert parties that even if the party motioning for 
sanctions cannot prove all elements of its destruction-of-evidence 
claim, including the most important element that the other party 
actually destroyed relevant information, the court can use 
discretion and award monetary sanctions if the party does not 
follow the court’s instructions regarding electronic evidence 
exactly. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Technology continues to evolve.203  As a result, issues regarding 
use of electronic evidence will only become more common.204  
Although one purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to 
promote efficiency,205 case law illustrates that, at times, discovery 
involving electronic information is far from efficient.206 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. See, e.g., Larry Velez, Reliable Offshore Networking, META Group Research—
Delta (Aug. 28, 2003), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/ 
displayArticle.do?oid=42510 (last visited March 20, 2004) (discussing information 
technology offshore outsourcing and stating that “[w]ide-area network services will 
transition toward IP/VPNs . . . .”) (copy on file with author); Earl Perkins & Steve 
Kleynhans, Skipping Windows Generations: Migrating to Win2003, META Group 
Research—Delta (Aug. 19, 2003), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/ 
jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=42384 (last visited March 20, 2004) (discussing 
corporate server operating system migration strategies and noting that the sunset 
of Microsoft Windows NT support is leading some organizations to skip a 
migration to Win2000 and instead organizations are migrating to Win2003) (copy 
on file with author). 
 204. See Brown & Weiner, supra note 9, at 17 (“Computers and their progeny 
are here to stay until technology advances beyond these limitations.  Until then, 
lawyers practicing in this digital age must appreciate their obligations with respect 
to handling electronic evidence, including how to locate, preserve[,] and produce 
such evidence . . . .”). 
 205. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (stating defendant complicated 
matters and “set off a high-tech wild goose chase”); see also Scheindlin & Rabkin, 
supra note 2, at 378 (asserting that trial courts’ resolution of electronic discovery 
disputes results in a “patchwork of varying discovery ‘rules’ across the country” and 
does not enhance the efficiency of electronic discovery). 
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Today when a discovery dispute involves a request for either 
electronic information that appears unduly burdensome, or where 
the information is no longer available, decisions by district courts 
in the Eighth Circuit provide little guidance regarding how it will 
act.  Parties should proceed through discovery by responding in 
good faith to discovery requests.  In addition, parties must act in 
good faith to preserve relevant information that is or may be 
subject to litigation.  Nevertheless, practicing attorneys know that a 
case will arise where one party will receive an unduly burdensome 
request, or the attorney’s client has destroyed (possibly in good 
faith) relevant information subject to litigation.  When such 
situations arise, courts will make decisions on an ad hoc basis and 
at times courts may apply guidelines or tests that vary from one case 
to the next. 
As noted in Antioch, the court examines case-specific facts to 
reach a decision regarding how to manage discovery of electronic 
information.207  There is no evidence that the court, as compared to 
the parties, is in a better position to understand the mechanics 
involved in recovering archived information.  Based on the 
decision in Antioch, it appears that the court relies on guidance 
from other courts to determine the course of action.208  In addition, 
a detailed, well-articulated brief may help influence the court in 
determining the course of action.  Consequently, attorneys 
involved in electronic discovery disputes should take notice that a 
carefully crafted brief may protect the client by ensuring the other 
party produces relevant information, or by saving the client from 
searching endlessly for unnecessary information. 
Electronic discovery cost disputes are one of the most 
troublesome areas where courts make decisions on an ad hoc basis.  
Concord, Toghiyany, and Zubulake provide examples of how the 
courts apply discretion when determining which party should bear 
the cost of electronic discovery.209  Aside from the seven-factor test 
denoted by a court within the Second Circuit in Zubulake, attorneys 
have very little guidance regarding how a court might decide which 
party will bear the cost of electronic discovery.  Because the federal 
rules do not adequately address how to manage electronic 
 
 207. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 649-52 (D. 
Minn. 2002). 
 208. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra Part III.B (analyzing resolution of electronic discovery cost 
disputes). 
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discovery, the outcome of electronic discovery cost disputes is 
unpredictable. 
It is uncertain how the district courts within the Eighth Circuit 
will reach a decision regarding electronic discovery costs.  An 
Eighth Circuit district court may adopt the seven-factor test 
established in Zubulake, but even the Zubulake court noted that the 
factors simply provide a guideline.  Without adopting the Zubulake 
seven-factor test, the Eighth Circuit district courts will most likely 
continue to use discretion on a case-by-case basis, providing little 
guidance for attorneys.  By analyzing the facts of a case, rather than 
establishing a general guideline, Eighth Circuit district courts that 
encounter electronic discovery cost disputes will witness time-
consuming and expensive litigation. 
The issue regarding evidence spoliation is one additional 
electronic discovery issue where courts have flexibility and again 
apply discretion in resolving the dispute.210  Although parties strive 
to manage information effectively so they are able to locate relevant 
information when they receive an extensive discovery request for 
documents, the parties must act in good faith to avoid inadvertent 
destruction of relevant information.  Destruction of relevant 
information will result in sanctions.211 
Although courts act with discretion in applying sanctions for 
destruction of evidence, Lewy and Lexis-Nexis illustrate that 
sanctions can vary from an adverse jury instruction to monetary 
sanctions.212  In addition, in the event a party cannot prove 
destruction of the evidence, a court may still impose monetary 
sanctions.213  Although attorneys know that a court will impose 
sanctions for willful destruction of relevant documents, the courts’ 
use of discretion in determining the type of sanction to impose 
again leaves attorneys guessing. 
Antioch, Concord, Toghiyany, Zubulake, Lewy, and Lexis-Nexis all 
illustrate how courts analyze electronic discovery disputes, 
 
 210. See supra Part III.C (discussing electronic evidence spoliation and the 
range of possible sanctions). 
 211. Cf. Redish, supra note 45, at 620 (noting that the question regarding 
evidence spoliation is one regarding what the appropriate sanction should be for 
violating the duty of preservation). 
 212. Compare Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 
1988) (stating that an adverse jury instruction may be proper when a company 
implements a document-retention policy in bad faith) with Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 
F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that defendant’s conduct 
warranted monetary sanctions). 
 213. Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 
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regardless of the dispute subject, on a case-by-case basis.  The result 
is that attorneys do not have standard guidelines to operate within 
when trying to resolve electronic discovery disputes.  Instead, the 
disputes encroach on already busy court schedules.  The Eighth 
Circuit courts, along with other circuits, appear poised to continue 
their pattern of time-consuming, ad hoc decision making.  Until 
the federal rules adequately address electronic discovery, it appears 
that no manageable solution producing predictable results is on 
the horizon.  Practitioners have suggested that modification of the 
federal rules will correct the problems associated with electronic 
discovery.214  Quite possibly, the rule makers continue to let courts 
set electronic discovery rules on an ad hoc basis because the rule 
makers are unable to determine a more effective solution. 
 
 214. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 327, 381 (asserting that Rule 34 
has shortcomings regarding how it addresses discovery of electronic information 
and the need to adapt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to electronic 
information, and specifically suggesting revising Rule 34 to permit courts to 
distinguish between paper and electronic evidence); Redish, supra note 45, at 626 
(declaring that to take account of the use of computers and other electronic data 
storage means, the discovery rules need to be substantially modified); The Sedona 
Conference, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for 
Addressing Electronic Document Production 2, 6-7 (Mar. 2003), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/publications_html (last visited March 20, 
2004) (stating that the working group rejected the argument that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide an adequate framework to address issues 
regarding electronic discovery). 
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